Vol.572 域外 | Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence,Vol.33,No.1

  Canadian Journal of 

Law & Jurisprudence

  《加拿大法律和法理学杂志》

Volume 33 - Issue 1 - February 2020

《加拿大法律和法理学杂志》是一个法理学和法哲学的论坛。目前的编辑是加拿大韦仕敦大学（Western University，2012年之前名为西安大略大学，The University of Western Ontario）的Richard Bronaugh和Andrew Botterell。其主题十分广泛，包括但不限于，探究法律的本质，对法律理论进行哲学思考与批判, 对法律或司法推理的形式和性质进行检验，研究涉及伦理问题的法律实践，从哲学的角度来研究当代社会面临的具体法律问题。该刊于每年2月和8月出版，每半年出版一期(与剑桥大学出版社合作)。每期通常包括八到十篇文章。尽管该刊会涉及一些论述法律和政治思想的高度一般化和抽象化的文章，但其往往更倾向于那些涉及以一种哲学的方式来探讨更具体的法律问题的文章。

刊文摘要

01

在不明所以之时决定“发生了什么？”：找寻司法上事实发现之合法性的理论基础

Deciding, ‘What Happened?’ When We Don’t Really Know: Finding Theoretical Grounding for Legitimate Judicial Fact-Finding

             Nayha Acharyal

在许多法律争议中，“发生了什么？”是个重要的问题，并且经常没有简明的答案。事实发现是一项充满不确定性的工作，出现偏差的风险无可避免。照此，我的问题是，在何种基础上我们能够接受司法的事实发现之合法性。我的结论是，可接受的事实决定依赖于对事实发现的合法程序的遵从。采用于尔根·哈贝马斯的观点，我提供了司法的事实认定之可接受性的理论根基。该理论主张，法律程序必须体现出将法律主体当作平等与自主行为人的尊重。这使两项程序特征成为必要。其一，事实发现程序必须在事实上可靠。这要求：（1）相关证据是可采纳的，其排除的正当化立基于对人的自主的尊重；（2）有错误风险的操作是内在地连贯与一致的；（3）证明标准在于，在最低限度上，对可能性的平衡；（4）证据被理性地使用。其二，事实发现程序必须保证充分的参与权。这项工作能够被正当化——民事司法制度并不完美，但其中有着可实现的条件来完善它们，在这些条件上绝对不可妥协退让。

The crucial question for many legal disputes is “what happened,”? and there is often no easy answer. Fact-finding is an uncertain endeavor and risk of inaccuracy is inevitable. As such, I ask, on what basis can we accept the legitimacy of judicial fact-findings. I conclude that acceptable factual determinations depend on adherence to a legitimate process of fact-finding. Adopting Jürgen Habermas’s insights, I offer a theoretical grounding for the acceptability of judicial fact-finding. The theory holds that legal processes must embody respect for legal subjects as equal and autonomous agents. This necessitates two procedural features. First, fact-finding processes must be factually reliable. This requires: (a) relevant evidence is admissible and exclusions are justified based on respecting human autonomy; (b) error-risk management is internally coherent and consistent; (c) the standard of proof is, at minimum, a balance of probabilities; (d) evidence is used rationally. Second, fact-finding processes must ensure fulsome participation rights. This project is justificatory—civil justice systems are imperfect, but there are attainable conditions that make them good, which must never be compromised.

02

错误支付的实质等同者？

Materially Identical to Mistaken Payment

Tatiana Cutts

错误支付是不当得利的“核心情形”，它对这一私法领域的发展产生了强有力的影响。对Peter Birks来说，不当得利只是“所有实质上等同于错误支付之事件的法律”——它通过对核心情形的抽象过程来塑造。但这引出了一个问题：我们如何计算出与错误支付“实质等同”的东西？最明显的出发点，同时也是Birks所选择的，是金钱的核心特征：金钱是有价值的。因此，“所有实质上等同于错误支付之事件的法律”是“所有以牺牲一方利益为代价，不公正地使另一方得利之事件的法律”。

在本文中，我认为这个出发点是不正确的。与其寻找错误支付与其他事件之间的某些事实相似性，不如确定金钱在支持（justify）返还中所起的作用。而且在核心情形中支持返还的不是金钱所赋予的“价值”或“利益”，而是将付款人与收款人联系起来的法律交易关系（legal transaction）中的缺陷。收款人承担责任并不是因为她已经“得利了”，而是因为她是法律关系的参与方，在这种法律关系中有着制度性的理由来否定（收款人）。就像合同和侵权一样，价值的作用是次要的：在不可能或不需要以原物（返还）来纠正不公的情况下，被告必须支付能够最接近地实现该目标的总价额。

Mistaken payment is the ‘core case’ of unjust enrichment, and it has had a powerful effect on the development of this area of private law. For Peter Birks, unjust enrichment was simply ‘the law of all events materially identical to mistaken payment’—to be shaped through a process of abstraction from that core case. But this begs the question: how do we work out what counts as ‘materially identical’ to mistaken payment? The most obvious starting point, and that which Birks chose, is the central characteristic of money: money is valuable. Thus, ‘the law of all events materially identical to mistaken payments’ is ‘the law of all events that unjustly enrich one party at another’s expense’.

In this article, I argue that this starting point is incorrect. Rather than looking for some factual similarity between mistaken payment and other events, we should identify the role that money plays in justifying restitution. And what justifies restitution in the core case is not the ‘value’ or ‘benefit’ that money confers; rather, it is a defect in the legal transaction that links payor with payee. The payee is not liable because she has been ‘enriched’, but because she is the counterparty to a legal transaction which exhibits traits that there are institutional reasons to disavow. Just like contract and torts, the role of value is secondary: where correcting the injustice in specie is impossible or undesirable, the defendant must pay whichever sum will most nearly achieve that goal.

03

统一税制乃正义之要求

Tax Uniformity as a Requirement of Justice

Charles Delmotte

Barbara Fried认为，对所有收入水平施以不加区分的单一税率的统一税制，不能为正义所辩护。她进一步表示，在所有可能的税率结构中，仅基于公平理论设置的单一税制可能是最难以实现的。本文运用罗尔斯（John Rawls）和布坎南（James Buchanan）提出的契约主义-宪政观点（contractarian-constitutional perspective），认为统一税制可以被视为正义的要求。在对政治世界是如何现实地决定税收份额分配进行模拟后（自利方的行动受制于多数方），，我展示了统一性原则如何从宪法契约（constitutional contract）中产生。换言之，理性个体会在“无知之幕”（veil of uncertainty）下选择以统一性作为程序的约束；也即，他们对规则未来适用之情况了解有限。此外，我还阐明了统一性要求是如何将公平和效率的一般化准则纳入到财政政策中，因为它排除了财政剥削，并且限制了大多数人及其最有影响力的子群体选择朝向帕累托边界发展的政策，从而促进了得出使所有参与者都能接受的结果。

Barbara Fried takes the view that uniform taxation—that is, a single rate applicable to all income levels—cannot be defended on any grounds of justice. She goes further by saying that, of all possible rate structures, it might be “the hardest one”? to ground in “a”? theory of fairness. Using the contractarian-constitutional perspective advanced by John Rawls and James Buchanan, this article argues that tax uniformity can be seen as a requirement of justice. After modelling how the political world realistically decides to distribute tax shares (self-interested parties act under a majority constraint), I show how the uniformity principle could emerge from the constitutional contract. In other words, rational individuals would choose uniformity as a procedural constraint under a “veil of uncertainty”?; that is, with limited knowledge regarding their positions under the future application of the rule. Moreover, I elucidate how the uniformity requirement integrates generalized criteria of fairness and efficiency into fiscal politics as it precludes fiscal exploitation and constrains majorities, and their most influential subgroups, to opt for policies in the direction of the Pareto frontier, and as such promotes outcomes acceptable to all participants.

04

描述法律

Describing Law

Raff Donelson

法律哲学家对法律的性质提出了许多大胆的、有争议的主张。例如，有些人声称法律必然涉及强迫，而另一些人则不同意；有些人认为所有法律都具有推定的道德效力，而另一些人并不同意。我们至少可以用三种互不相容的方式来看待这些主张：（1）我们可以把它们看作是对法律本质的描述（描述主义），（2）我们可以把它们看作是对所讨论的法律哲学家的非描述态度的表达（表达主义），或者，（3）我们可以把它们看作是关于我们应该如何看待法律或社会秩序的实际主张（实用主义）。本文认为我们应当以实用主义的方式理解这些主张，作为我们应如何看待法律或法治社会的主张。

Legal philosophers make a number of bold, contentious claims about the nature of law. For instance, some claim that law necessarily involves coercion, while others disagree. Some claim that all law enjoys presumptive moral validity, while others disagree. We can see these claims in at least three, mutually exclusive ways: (1) We can see them as descriptions of law’s nature (descriptivism), (2) we can see them as expressing non-descriptive attitudes of the legal philosophers in question (expressivism), or (3) we can see them as practical claims about how we should view law or order our society (pragmatism). This paper argues that we should understand these claims in the pragmatist way, as claims about how we should view law or order society.

05

Coxford讲座：“寻求善：职业信任、正义和法治”

The Coxford Lecture Seek the Good: Professional Trust, Justice, and the Rule of Law Coxford

             Nayha Acharyal

当我被邀请担任加拿大总督时，我发现我有很多东西要重新学习。尽管我有作为法律系学生、教授和系主任的背景，但我必须重新审视我国宪法的法律原则和惯例，特别是它们涉及到英王室在加拿大的权威和职能。我的重新学习的过程使我更加钦佩法治在我国是多么宝贵，它的外表是多么薄弱和脆弱，它在接近正义方面是多么重要。更重要的是，我的这次“学习”（re-education）使我重新认识到，如果我们不利用法律来争取正义，那么学习和实践法律是一种空洞的追求。

When I was asked to serve as Governor General of Canada, I discovered I had much to relearn. Despite my background as a law student, professor, and dean, I had to revisit the legal principles and conventions of our constitution, especially as they relate to the authority and function of the Crown in Canada. My re-education enabled me to develop an even deeper admiration for how precious the rule of law is in our country, how thin and vulnerable its veneer can be, and how vital it is in moving closer to justice. Even more, my re-education revealed for me anew that the study and practice of law is a hollow pursuit if we do not use it to strive toward justice.

06

对年龄的合理调整

Reasonable Accommodation for Age

Refia Kaya

确保平等的自由需要中立的，即公正的，任何人都不会因为其个人特点而被剥夺自由的环境。宗教和残疾似乎是与现有社会和物质环境相冲突的特征。因此，关于宗教和残疾，本文主要论述了调整现有环境的必要性，即合理的调整（reasonable accommodation）。我的目的是从不同的角度讨论合理的调整，并怀疑是否应该将合理的调整扩展到年龄（age）问题。我认为，年龄会导致良知或宗教等文化上的差异。年龄也是疾病/能力的来源，因此可以将其与通常的残疾相比较。最终，年龄也可能与现有的社会和物质环境发生冲突。我进一步建议，在合理的调整方面，年龄不仅与宗教和残疾相似，而且也不同。因此，我认为，合理的调整应该以一种特殊的方式扩展到年龄。接下来的问题是，如何根据欧盟（EU）法律调整年龄，尤其是当我们认为合理的调节法在欧盟中不像在加拿大那样具有广泛的适用范围时。

Ensuring equal liberties requires neutral, i.e. impartial, settings where nobody would be deprived of freedom because of their personal characteristics. Religion and disability appear as characteristics which may clash with the existing social and physical environments. Therefore, the necessity of adjusting the existing environment, i.e., reasonable accommodation, is mostly discussed in reference to religion and disability. I aim to discuss reasonable accommodation from a different perspective and ask whether reasonable accommodation should be extended to age issues. I propose that age can lead to differences in conscience or culture like religion. Age can also be a source of dis/ability so it can be compared to accustomed disabilities. Eventually, age may also clash with the existing social and physical environments. I further propose that age is not only similar to but also different from religion and disability when it comes to reasonable accommodation. Therefore, I defend, reasonable accommodation should be extended to age in a special way. The next question then is how age could be accommodated under the European Union (EU) law, especially when we consider that reasonable accommodation law does not have a wide scope in the EU, unlike in Canada.

07

艾希曼的错误：国际刑法中欠缺考虑的问题

Eichmann’s Mistake: The Problem of Thoughtlessness in International Criminal Law

Itamar Mann

暴行往往是史无前例的，因此识别它们可能需要通过道德以及政治来判断，而不仅仅是适用法律规则。所以，被指控犯罪的潜在被告可能真的无法认识到惩治其犯罪行为的法律。自从汉娜·阿伦特（Hannah Arendt）在《艾希曼在耶路撒冷》（Eichmann in Jerusalem）中对此作出经典回应，这个问题便始终困扰着学者，他们注意到，大屠杀案件的被告们都表现得若无其事。与该领域的其他学者不同，我主张承认国际刑法中对“法律存在错误”的辩护。本文根据不同政治基础，假设出三个国际刑事案件以说明上述主张的利害关系，所有案件都紧切当前热点话题：针对气候变化的巨大风险的个人责任的案件；针对边境执法中的移民施虐者案件；以及针对堕胎诊所终止妊娠的个人责任案件。我认为应当采取双重路径：一方面，检察官和法官在对个人进行指控时，必须始终不排除彻底背离现有学说和先例的可能性。另一方面，他们必须承认，被告可能无法合理地认识法律，尤其是在这种背离可能发生之时。这两个必要条件之间的矛盾揭示了国际刑事审判的困境。总之，对“法律存在错误”辩护的承认，不过是为可以从根本上解决该学科困惑而构想的一种温和的理论解决方式。然而，在“国际社会”中参与者间规范分歧日益明显的今天，这一点却尤其重要。

（译者注：艾希曼，全名阿道夫·艾希曼，纳粹德国高管，在犹大大屠杀中执行“最终方案”的主要负责者）

Atrocities are often unprecedented and identifying them therefore may require moral and political judgement, not only the application of legal rules. Consequently, potential defendants charged for perpetrating them may be genuinely unable to recognize the law that prohibits their criminal activity. Starting from its classical treatment in Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem, this problem has perplexed scholars who have noted the seemingly normal character of defendants in mass atrocity cases. In disagreement with other scholars in the area, I argue for a recognition of a “mistake of law”? defense in international criminal law. The Article demonstrates the stakes of the claim through three hypothetical international criminal cases with different political underpinnings, all pertaining to burning contemporary concerns: cases against individuals responsible for the enormous risks of climate change; against abusers of migrants in the context of border enforcement; and against individuals responsible for the termination of pregnancies in abortion clinics. I argue for a dual approach: on the one hand, prosecutors and judges must constantly leave open the possibility of a radical departure from extant doctrine and precedent in charging individuals. On the other, they must recognize that defendants may reasonably not be able to recognize the law qua law, especially when such departures occur. The internal tension between these two imperatives sheds light on the predicament of international criminal adjudication. A recognition of the proposed mistake of law defense is but a modest doctrinal solution for a much more fundamental perplexity of the discipline. Yet it is especially crucial today, with an ever-clearer normative divergence among actors in the “international community.”?

08

霍布斯的第三种法理学：法律实用主义与二元论威胁

Hobbes’s Third Jurisprudence: Legal Pragmatism and the Dualist Menace

B.L.S. Nelson

本文探究将霍布斯的法理学适切理解为不可还原于传统自然法或法律实证主义的、法律理论中的“第三条道路”之可能性。我概述出两种可能的关于法律的“第三种理论”——法律实用主义与法律二元论——并论证道，在考虑其最宽泛意义时，《利维坦》最好被视为法律实用主义的示例。我考虑这种法律实用主义的解释是否能够在《利维坦》对民法之处理的检验中得以维持，并主张中只有当我们能够解决该章节的两个文本议题，实用主义的解释才是成功的。首先，当霍布斯主张法律使公共的（可共享的）理由之存在成为必要，他并未充分地辩护主权者在任何情境中都是这些理由之上独一无二的权威，尤其是在虑及已知的集体紧急状态（collective emergencies）之时。其次，霍布斯同时主张与否认主权者可以使正义罹于实现，这是自相矛盾的。两个问题都能够被法律实用主义最优地解决，尽管就第二个问题仍难以得出一种彻底令人满意的解决方案。结果就是，尽管《利维坦》应该被视为法律实用主义的一个片段，但每一种解读的背后都有取舍或妥协，这一结果不过是一个较优的选择而已。

This paper explores the possibility that Hobbesian jurisprudence is best understood as a “third way”? in legal theory, irreducible to classical natural law or legal positivism. I sketch two potential “third theories”? of law—legal pragmatism and legal dualism—and argue that, when considered in its broadest sense, Leviathan is best viewed as an example of legal pragmatism. I consider whether this legal pragmatist interpretation can be sustained in the examination of Leviathan’s treatment of civil law, and argue that the pragmatic interpretation can only be successful if we can resolve two textual issues in that chapter. First, while Hobbes argues that law entails the existence of public (sharable) reasons, he does not adequately defend the view that the sovereign is the unique authority over such reasons in all cases, especially as far as they concern known collective emergencies. Second, Hobbes both affirms and denies that a sovereign can fail to do justice, which is paradoxical. Both problems are best resolved by legal pragmatism, though the second problem resists a fully satisfying resolution. The upshot is that, although Leviathan ought to be regarded as an episode of legal pragmatism, there are trade-offs on every reading.

09

合同法中的比例性之谜：对私法理论的挑战？

The Proportionality Puzzle in Contract Law: A Challenge for Private Law Theory?

Zhong Xing Tan

本文探索了比例概念在英美法系合同法中的新运用，首先理解其内在逻辑，其次将其援引置于私法理论中。法官们呼吁“比例性”（proportionality）时究竟在做什么？这又说明了裁判的意识形态是什么呢？我从其他领域，特别是公法中使用比例性来揭示其作为手段-目的之合理性审查的内在合理性，以及平衡相互竞争的考虑因素的过程中获得了深刻的见解，我以非法性、惩罚和矫正成本（cost of cure）理论来说明这一点。我认为，比例性反映了一种务实的论证方法，表达了一种反对形式主义和反意识形态的结构化和透明的论证模式的愿望，自下而上地关注语境因素，在受诸如“自上而下”？的基于权利的意识形态或批判性的社群主义观点驱动的现有私法理论中独树一帜。

This article explores the emerging use of the proportionality concept in the contract law of the Anglo-common law world, first to understand its internal logic, and secondly, to situate its invocation within private law theory. What are judges doing when they appeal to “proportionality”?, and what does this say about the ideology of adjudication? I draw insights from the use of proportionality in other domains, in particular public law, to uncover its internal rationality as a means-ends rationality review coupled with a process of balancing competing considerations, which I illustrate with reference to the illegality, penalty, and cost of cure doctrines. I argue that proportionality reflects a method of pragmatic justification, expressing an aspiration towards a structured and transparent mode of argumentation that is anti-formal and anti-ideological, focusing from the bottom-up on contextual considerations, and occupying a distinct space against existing theories in private law driven, for instance, by “top-down”? rights-based ideologies or critical and communitarian perspectives.

10

平等与无家可归者

Equity and Homelessness

Andy Yu

我认为无家可归现象需要公平的干预。这种干预的动机涉及国家对所有权制度的规定。此外，干预之动机既是造成无家可归现象的原因，但同时也可以解决无家可归的问题。笔者认为，公平利益的本质与这种动机相对应。具体而言，这涉及两种平等权利。其一为一项消极的平等权利，即国家对无家可归者不得行使将人民排除在国有财产之外的权利。其二为一项积极的平等权利，即要求国家为无家可归者提供住房，或者至少采取相关措施。

I argue that homelessness calls for equitable intervention. The motivation for such intervention involves the state’s provision of the system of property rights. This will be one that is responsible for but can also solve homelessness. The nature of the equitable interest responds to this motivation. There is a negative equitable right for the state not to exercise its right to exclude people from state-owned property against homeless people. There is also a positive equitable right for the state to provide housing to the homeless, or at least take steps towards doing so.

法律思想 | 中国政法大学法理学研究所